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ABSTRACT 
In the embodied, situated, enacted and distributed approaches to cognition, the 
coordinative role of language comes to the fore. Language, with its symbolic 
properties, arises from a multimodal stream of interactive events and gradually 
gains power to constrain them in a functional and adaptive way. In this article, 
we attempt to integrate three approaches to information in cognitive systems to 
provide a theoretical background to the process of development of language as 
such a coordinator. Ecological psychology provides an explanation for how any 
behaviors or events become informative through the process of “tuning” to 
affordances that control individual and collective behavior. The dynamical 
approach helps to operationalize this control as a functional reduction of 
degrees of freedom of individual and collective systems. Cognitive semiotics 
provides a typology of constraints showing their interrelations: it proposes 
conditions under which informational controls that function as indices and 
icons may become symbolic, providing a qualitatively different form of 
constraint, which can be partially ungrounded from the ongoing stream of 
multimodal events. The article illustrates the proposed processes with examples 
from actual parent-infant interaction and points to ways of verifying them in a 
more quantitative way. 
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The recent “ecological turn” in the cognitive sciences acknowledges the 
primacy of action, situated in a particular social and physical environment, as 
determining the emergence of cognitive skills (e.g., Gallagher, 2005; A. 
D.Wilson & Golonka, 2013; M. Wilson, 2002). Because embodiment, action-
dependency, and distributed character pertain not only to motor coordination 
but also to such processes as thinking and language, their coordinative and 
interpersonal dimensions come to the fore. On this view, language, rather than 
being treated as a cognitive module or individual computational skill, is seen 
primarily as a system of constraints, which emerges in co-action in a particular 
physical and cultural environment and which has the power to control 
individual cognition and interindividual coordination (Rączaszek-Leonardi, 
2009; Sinha, 2009; Steffensen & Fill, 2014). 
These changes in perspective are particularly important for the study of 
language development. First, they change the way we think about language 
development itself: not as a child “cracking the linguistic code,” that is, 
mastering an individual linguistic skill by acquiring (or parameterizing inborn) 
rules, but rather as a gradual tuning process adapting the child to the way 
language functions in social encounters, shaping everyday interactions from 
day one (Bruner, 1983; Rączaszek-Leonardi, Nomikou, & Rohlﬁng, 2013). 
Second, language development becomes a particularly useful window for 
developing an account of how language, as a system of symbols, may emerge 
from embodied multimodal interactions with others. This is because, especially 
in early development, it is acutely evident that early uses of language are fully 
grounded in streams of dynamical individual and interactive events. 
Yet, on the other hand, language has the undeniable capacity of 
removing us from the here and now, evoking abstract relationships as well as 
nonpresent or even nonexistent entities. Due to its compositional structure, it 
also has its own syntactic combinatorial properties, and, crucially, its elements 
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and structures seem to have a degree of “arbitrariness” and conventionality with 
respect to how linguistic forms relate to their semantic and communicative 
functions because the clues to these functions are usually missing from word 
sounds (Deacon, 2011; Peirce, 1931). Because language is initially acquired 
within the aforementioned embodied and grounded social communication 
context, the acquisition of such an “ungrounded” capacity to control 
communicative events over and above relating them to the immediately present 
context of action requires an explanation. 
In this respect, we see language acquisition as an inverse to Harnad’s 
symbol grounding problem (Harnad, 1990; Rączaszek-Leonardi & Deacon in 
preparation; Deacon (2012, in press)). Whereas Harnad, and many before him 
(e.g., Dreyfus, 1972; Searle, 1980), saw a problem in how abstract symbols get 
their meaning, that is, how they are grounded in the world, our problem is the 
opposite: how concrete physical events or objects, embedded causally in 
dynamical interactions, may ever become abstract and symbolic. Posed in this 
way, the problem is quite similar in its core, we claim, to the more general 
problem that ecological psychology has been facing: how to account for the 
nature and function of symbolic information from its exclusively dynamics-
oriented perspective (e.g., Pattee, 1982; Reed, 1996; Rączaszek-Leonardi & 
Kelso, 2008). 
Formulated more speciﬁcally in the context of language development, 
posing the question in this way calls for a change in the starting assumptions. 
Assuming that linguistic forms present in the infant’s environment are 
intrinsically symbolic (i.e., are conventional, arbitrary, and have formal-
systemic properties) in a sense creates the grounding problem, which requires 
explaining how the child learns about this symbolicity and grounds it 
semantically and pragmatically (Harnad, 1990; Varshavskaya, 2002). Assuming 
instead that linguistic utterances are initially immersed in dynamic interactional 
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events (Bruner, 1983; Lock, 1978; Zukow-Goldring, 1996), similar to any other 
action or gesture, and are “just” one type of such events, leads to the 
“ungrounding” problem, namely how, for a developing child, do these 
grounded forms ever gain symbolic properties? 
We propose to validate this approach to the symbol emergence problem 
in language development by illustrating the processes that are crucial for the 
“ungrounding” process using naturalistic examples from language development 
studies. The theoretical exposition is thus necessarily brief (a more detailed 
account can be found in Rączaszek-Leonardi & Deacon, in preparation), shortly 
introducing the three theoretical pillars on which we base our account of 
language development: ecological psychology supported by dynamical systems 
approach and cognitive semiotics. Next, from this integrated theoretical 
perspective, we describe the informational processes of interaction control and 
the ways language might be involved in them. This paves the way to a proposed 
process of ungrounding of some of the informational forms from the immediate 
context. We illustrate each element of this process with concrete examples from 
microanalyses of everyday infant-caretaker interactions, provided by 
longitudinal video corpora (Nomikou & Rohlﬁng, 2011; Szufnarowska & 
Rohlfing, 2014) and from the language development literature. Where possible, 
we point to the ways of verifying the proposed claims quantitatively and point 
to work in which this is already being done. 
Brief theoretical background 
We construct our account of language development on a foundation consisting 
of three theoretical approaches: ecological psychology, dynamical systems 
account of information in biological systems, and the semiotic approach to 
signiﬁcation. We think that each of these frameworks contributes a crucial 
piece of the puzzle of language emergence in development and that their 
integration sheds light on how these frameworks might complement each other 
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in the effort to solve the ungrounding problem. 
Situating the explanation within ecological psychology has a twofold 
theoretical goal. First, ecological psychology recognizes the importance of the 
relation between an agent and the environment and spells out clearly how 
certain events and their parameters in the environment might become 
intentional and informative so that they provide functional constraints on 
behavior (Gibson, 1979/1986; Heft, 2001). Broadly speaking (for a more 
detailed account see Rączaszek-Leonardi, 2016), ecological psychology 
provides a framework that accounts for the ubiquitous embodiment of cognition 
by showing how certain forms (such as repetitive behaviors or sequences of 
events) become informative through their particular history in the organism-
environment relations on multiple timescales. An important aspect of this 
framework is also its involvement of values as boundary conditions in the 
processes of perceiving and development of affordances (Hodges & Baron, 
1992; Rączaszek-Leonardi & Nomikou, 2015). 
Second, the ecological psychology approach can be extended by 
providing an ecologically valid account of how some of those informational 
forms become symbolic. Our core assumption is that there is a parallel between 
a “symbol ungrounding problem” in language development and the difﬁculties 
that ecological psychology encounters attempting to account for the capacity of 
symbolic cognition, including language. We propose that integration with the 
other two approaches, dynamical systems account of information and cognitive 
semiotics, can bring us a step closer to dealing with this difﬁculty by leveraging 
principles of informational processes in ecological psychology to help explain 
symbolic functioning of humans. 
The contribution of the dynamical systems account is to provide a 
conceptualization of informational processes in living organisms as emergent 
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stabilization of selective constraints on dynamics1. The argument has been 
developed in many works (e.g., Deacon, 2011; Pattee, 1969, 1982; Pattee & 
Rączaszek-Leonardi, 2012; Polanyi, 1968; Rączaszek-Leonardi & Kelso, 2008) 
and for the space consideration we cannot present it at length. In short, it 
advocates the necessity of complementary descriptions to account for the 
functioning and adaptability of organisms both in terms of natural dynamics 
and informational forms. In contrast to most cognitive science approaches to 
symbols, this approach does not treat informational forms as amodal 
abstractions but rather as physical entities that act as constraints on organ- ism 
dynamics. Due to their historicity, and the irreversibility of the evolutionary 
processes that selected both their shapes and their constraining functions, the 
informational forms cannot be usefully subsumed within a dynamical 
description purely in terms of laws of physics (Pattee, 1969, 1982; Rączaszek-
Leonardi & Kelso, 2008). Accepting such relations between dynamics and 
informational forms provides an operationalization of the meaning of the latter, 
which is compatible with ecological psychology, namely, as a process of 
functional constraining of a system, reducing its possible states and trajectories 
relevantly to given situational and boundary conditions. 
Because, due to their capability of capturing multiple interacting 
constraints in the study of behavioral dynamics, the dynamical systems methods 
were methods of choice (source of formalisms) for ecological psychology for a 
long time (Haken, 1990; Kelso, 1995), applied also in theories and research on 
development (Smith & Thelen, 2003; Smith et al., 2010; Thelen & Smith, 1994; 
van Geert, 1994), such operationalization should be compatible with this 
approach and facilitate the leverage of its explanatory power to apply to so-
                                                   
1 The constraints are understood here as enabling constraints. The degrees of freedom of 
the system are bound so as the system is enabled to perform a function (like, e.g., in 
acquiring a skilled movement). 
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called higher cognitive processes. The dynamical systems approach helps to 
demystify the notion of “interpretation” in informational processes and 
cognitive semiotics. In this way, instead of being a hidden (and often 
underdeﬁned) mental process, the interpretation of an informational constraint 
becomes directly measurable. Even if it can be seen as being partly a product of 
attentional and memory processes (e.g., Smith et al., 2010) it is also assessable 
in terms of the way it limits the possible states and trajectories of a system. 
Finally, cognitive semiotics introduces a ﬁner-grained account of the 
informational constraining process. Semiotics distinguishes multiple relations 
that can hold between an informational form (in semiotics, a sign vehicle) and 
its “meaning” (Deacon, 1997, 2011; Peirce, 1931). An iconic relation depends 
on form similarity between sign vehicle and what it refers to; indexical 
reference depends on contiguity, or direct causal connection. Symbolic relations 
are more complex than the other two. They are usually described as devoid of 
any such (causal or shape-based) relationships and characterized by an arbitrary 
mapping (but see later). The application of such semiotic distinctions among 
the ways of signiﬁcation provides an insight into the kinds of constraints that 
informational forms may provide as well as the kinds of historical processes 
they require to become effective. Most important, the semiotic hierarchy of the 
modes of signiﬁcation proposed by Peirce (1931) and reﬁned by Deacon (1997) 
for the domain of cognitive psychology and language evolution offers a 
framework for understanding the relations between immediately contingent or 
causal (indexical) or similarity-based (iconic) constraints and symbolic ones. 
Using this framework, we demonstrate how the emergence of symbolic 
signiﬁcation rests on a rich infrastructure of indexical and iconic relations in 
which symbols participate. 
Language development as an ungrounding process 
Perhaps the most important difference distinguishing our approach (e.g., 
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Rączaszek-Leonardi & Deacon, in preparation) from most other theoretical 
approaches is that the concept of “symbol” is not treated in terms of a mapping 
relation. Rather, as we explain later, it is understood to be a relation that is 
dependent on a complex semiotic infrastructure created by prior 
communication. So the main problem is not how children ground abstract 
formal symbols (somehow delivered to them as such) but how their embodied, 
embedded, and situated communicative behaviors can ever become symbolic. 
This is what makes it an ungrounding process rather than a grounding process. 
Consequently, our analysis requires an account of how informational forms in 
general function within situational dynamics; how they become progressively 
decoupled from properties shared with these dynamical relations; and how, 
despite this decoupling, they maintain their controlling power over the 
pragmatic functions of communication. 
This is in contraposition with most approaches to language 
development. To our knowledge, not many frameworks tackled the problem in 
a similar way. Lock (1980), for example, presented some ideas of how within 
social interactions actions become coordinated with (and by) language. 
However, taken up by constructivist approaches (e.g., Tomasello, 2003), the 
learning context has been usually simpliﬁed, such as when, for example, 
gestures rather than situated behavior and events were interpreted as 
prelinguistic means helping children to enter the language system. In this 
article, we strive to take into account the complexity and history of interaction. 
Large fragments of the path to constructing our approach are shared 
with ecological psychology framework and its views on development in general 
and language development in particular. Our approach is informed by systemic 
theories of development, where physical, social, and environmental factors 
interact at each point (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; van Geert, 1994). Central to our 
approach is the notion of a continuity of development and the formation of a 
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developmental pathway. This means that we believe that any behavior, 
experience, or ability at any moment in time is a result of the cumulative effect 
of previous interactions within the system and at the same time shapes future 
development prospectively (Fogel, Garvey, Hsu, & West-Stroming, 2006; Hsu 
& Fogel, 2003). Furthermore, guided by ecological systems theory we consider 
the tuning processes in action as central developmental mechanisms resulting in 
gradual shaping of perception and behavior, which in this way can be informed 
by the physical and social attributes (Rączaszek-Leonardi et al., 2013) and 
values inherent in the system (Nomikou & Rączaszek-Leonardi, 2015). 
Language development is thus placed within a theory of development 
that emphasizes adaptation and perception–action cycles in the world and “uses 
differentiation model rather than construction models … or the maturation 
models” (Dent, 1990, p. 690) to account for developmental change. 
Congruently with earlier approaches to language development within ecological 
psychology, functional and pragmatic aspects of language come to the fore 
(e.g., Dent, 1990; Reed, 1995). The focus is thus on “how the use of language 
can be an event or part of an event” (Dent, 1990, p. 690) in a changing 
environment of a developing child (Read, 1995). However, although we do feel 
that considerable efforts have been made to bring the researchers closer to a 
“theory of the environment in which language-learning children ﬁnd 
themselves” (Dent, 1990, p. 194), perhaps because of the general individualistic 
Zeitgeist of the time, even those functionalist approaches emphasized more the 
possibility that language is an affordance “through which” invariants of the 
world can be detected. In our approach, we strive to see language as part of 
events but not just any part, or even a part “through which” one might see the 
world but a part with controlling (constraining) role, accumulated through a 
history of interaction (ontogeny) and in the process of cultural selection. We 
stress that the elaboration of the theory of acquiring language as a system of 
social coordination crucially includes an explanation how an active agent 
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becomes increasingly in control over (mainly social) environment. 
We cannot do justice to a spectrum of the relevant approaches here to 
make a comprehensive comparison. Let us only mention two other works that 
are undoubtedly an inspiration to us in the present task. One is Bruner’s (1983) 
account of language development, in which he underscores the importance of 
interactive routines at each step of this process. The other is Elizabeth Bates’s 
work published in The Emergence of Symbols (1979), in which she also 
employs a semiotic perspective to analyze the process of symbol acquisition. 
Our work can be treated as an amendment and extension to her account (for 
details see Rączaszek-Leonardi & Deacon, in preparation) undertaken in an 
ecological vein, that is, focusing on understanding how language is a part of 
acting with others that accumulates a particular controlling role and not on 
internal mental processes. 
Because within this framework, informational forms function as 
constraints on complex multimodal dynamics, the ﬁrst step, which is the topic 
of the section “Shaping Early Interaction Dynamics,” is to identify the relevant 
dynamics and explain how they may become controlled. This requires studying 
human interactivity at very early stages and acknowledging a variety of 
multimodal informational controls at work that make early caregiver-infant 
interaction already relevant, purposeful, intersubjective, intentional, and 
conventional. The integration of the three approaches proposed earlier allows 
for the analysis of this process as a progressive emergence, within the speciﬁc 
niche, of social affordances, which have the power to enable meaningful 
behaviors of interactants. 
Next, in the section “The Ways Language Means” we acknowledge that 
from the earliest moments of interactions within the social world, language 
serves as a constraint on social behavior (Nomikou & Rohlﬁng, 2011). Thus, 
speech is always fully grounded in the multimodal streams of events, and—
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through a history of interaction—regulates the trajectories of social encounters 
similar to the way that any other gesture and action might do. Thus, it is 
important to note, as many researchers in language development indeed have 
(Bates, 1979; Bruner, 1983), that language has an important, multifaceted 
informational control role before becoming symbolic. Language can play this 
role because from early on, infants are sensitive toward human speech. This can 
help them, for example, to tune to the rhythms of interaction (Trevarthen, 1974) 
and to partition actions, which may in turn help in categorization of objects and 
events (see a summary in Rohlﬁng & Tani, 2011). Semiotic analysis is 
particularly helpful here and enables us to illustrate how language functions in a 
rich network of semiotic relations other than symbolic and point out that such 
grounding is crucial for subsequently developing its symbolicity. 
Finally, in the section “The Emergence of Symbols,” we propose (after 
Deacon, 1997, 2011) that for the ungrounding of such functionally grounded 
language (a set of controls on dynamics) the crucial process is grounding in 
another system. Thus utterances, which always remain grounded in interactions, 
are at the same time connected with other linguistic utterances. Both types of 
grounding are realized via semiotic relations (iconic, indexical) that reﬂect the 
causal structure of events, allowing for making predictions and for control. 
However, grounding utterances in the system of other utterances allows for a 
qualitatively different type of control, not only by individual linguistic elements 
but also by the relations among them. It is this systemic property, and not the 
conventionality or arbitrariness, which appears in much “earlier” types of 
semiotic control, that allows for ungrounding of symbols from the ongoing 
stream of events and brings a novel (formal) type of causality to control those 
dynamics (Bates, 1979; Deacon, 2011). 
Showing that this indeed might be the way this process happens in 
language development requires showing two things: ﬁrst, that an infant’s 
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environment is structured in such a way as to prioritize the emergence of the 
linguistic layer (e.g., utterances increasingly often surrounded by other 
utterances, both in individual speech and in dialogue), which may facilitate 
tuning to relations among linguistic utterances. Second, that those relations are 
effective constraints that enable novel (e.g., combinatorial) forms of control. 
We now turn to elaborating each of the three processes and illustrating 
each of them with examples from real interactions. 
Shaping early interaction dynamics 
Adhering to the main tenets of the ecological psychology approach makes a 
researcher turn toward the environment of the developing human and be 
especially attentive to the emergence of relations between a cognitive system 
and this environment (Gibson, 1979/1986; Mace, 1977). Due to the formation 
of such relations in evolution, environment is already inherently informative for 
an agent, as the agent’s body and senses are tuned to perceive it in terms of 
affordances, that is, tuned for particular adaptive action–perception cycles 
(Gibson, 1979/ 1986). In development, these relations can be ﬁne-tuned, this 
time in a culturally speciﬁc way. This angle is useful to understand the already 
rich and meaningful dynamics of infant-caregiver interactions and their 
progressive shaping by tuning to particular events and behaviors. To this end, in 
previous work we employed ecological psychology principles of tuning to 
affordances in development to show how any action or gesture might become 
meaningful in parent-infant interaction (Rączaszek-Leonardi, 2016; Rączaszek-
Leonardi et al., 2013). What is crucial for this to occur is a particular structuring 
of the infant’s environment. In the case of social-cognitive skills (i.e., virtually 
the entirety of skills at the very early stages of the infant’s life), acquiring them 
through such tuning depends on social recreation of important events for the 
developing agent. We termed such an environment of contingent relations, 
recreated for infants by their conspeciﬁcs, “social physics” (Rączaszek-
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Leonardi & Deacon, in preparation) to underscore its inevitability and 
systematicity, which helps a child discover its “laws” and tune the senses to 
these, as directly picked up social affordances (for a description of the rich 
structure of the social environment, intertwining social and community 
practices, artifacts and places, see Heft, this issue). 
Thus, we underscore the importance of a socially structured 
environment, consisting of reenacted social routines, or “formats” (Bruner, 
1983; Rohlﬁng, Wrede, Vollmer, & Oudeyer, 2016), in the process of which 
particular actions become informative (controlling). Such actions (gazes, 
movements, gestures, vocalizations) gradually take on the role of constraints 
enabling particular individual and interactive behavior. Note that this account 
is, in a sense, “movement ﬁrst” (Rączaszek-Leonardi et al., 2013). Infants’ 
actions are embedded (sometimes even by a kind of coercion) within culturally 
shaped recreated sequences of events, for example, when a mother looms over 
the baby and smiles to elicit a smile at a deﬁnite moment of interaction. Due to 
repetition, which preserves the crucial characteristics of routines, the infant can 
tune to particular actions as affordances for his or her own actions and use his 
or her own actions as affordances that elicit the actions of others (Nomikou, 
Leonardi, Radkowska, Rączaszek-Leonardi, & Rohlﬁng, 2017). In other words, 
he or she learns how the “social physics” works and how to control events 
within it. This is congruent with the ecological psychology account of how 
actions and objects may become intentional: rather than by being embedded in 
belief systems, they are embedded in particular “projects” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1963), which have their own goal-directed (Heft, 1989; Rohlﬁng et al., 2016), 
value-realizing (Hodges & Baron, 1992; Rączaszek-Leonardi & Nomikou, 
2015), and collective (Rączaszek-Leonardi & Cowley, 2012; Rączaszek-
Leonardi et al., 2013; Richardson, Marsh, & Schmidt, 2010) structure. 
The development of such social control obviously encompasses a much 
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broader set of social signals than just linguistic ones. Following, we illustrate 
this process with an example of a familiar nonlinguistic behavior: gazing. From 
early on, the gaze of an infant functions as an informational constraint on the 
mother, signiﬁcantly changing her behavior in a dyadic encounter. Such 
regularities lead to the gaze gradually becoming a sign to be used 
communicatively not only by the mother but also by the child. 
Example 1: Gaze as interaction coordinator 
This interaction is between a mother and her 3-month-old son. The sequence 
begins with a verbalization of the action of the infant by the mother, namely, 
that he has put a toy in his mouth (line 2) and he does that habitually (line 4). 
1 I: <vocalization> 
 
2 M: immer alles in den Mund, ne?a) 
     always everything in the mouth huh? 
3 (0.9 s) 
4 M: so (.) mach immer alles rein da 
     so (.) put always everything in there 
5 (1.2 s) 
Until this point, the infant has been gazing up toward the ceiling (image a). In 
line 6 the infant turns his head to the side and the mother immediately follows 
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the infant’s gaze and looks in the same direction (image b). The mother reacts 
to the gaze shift of the infant and repeatedly asks the infant what he is looking 
at (lines 6–10).  
 
 
6 M: b)ja was ist denn da? (0.4 s) was ist denn da? 
      Yes what is there? (0.4 s) what is there? 
7 (0.3 s) 
8 M: Mäuschen (1 s) hm? 
     little mouse (1 s) huh? 
9 (0.4 s) 
10 M: was ist denn da? (..) ist das ein Würfel? 
     What is there?(..) is that a cube? 
After the pause in line 10, she asks the infant if what he is looking at is a stuffed 
toy in the form of a cube and repeats her attribution of his interest in line 11, 
while at the same time acting upon the object, grasping it, shaking it (image c), 
and repositioning it at a higher location (image d). 
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11 M: ist dasc) ein Würfel?d) 
     is that a cube?  
 
 
What makes the stabilization of gaze as a signal for constraining mutual 
attention and thus interaction possible is a systematic enactment of only a 
subset of possible events around the child. This provides a culturally structured 
environment within which an infant learns how gazes usually work in social 
interactions (Rączaszek-Leonardi et al., 2013). It provides a child with a high 
degree of predictability of the events and a capacity for moving “properly” in 
the social world. Due to the way that gaze and other actions control social 
interactions, already in the case of nonverbal behaviors the child may predict 
the uptake of his or her signaling as well as learn to respond acceptably to the 
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caregiver behavior. 
Each of the three approaches we integrate in this article has a role in 
helping to understand what is going on in creating such information-controlled 
social dynamics. The framework of ecological psychology ensures that due 
attention is paid to the structuring of the niche, but in addition to the traditional 
approach we acknowledge the predominantly social character of this world 
(Rączaszek-Leonardi et al., 2013; Reed, 1995). Two tenets of ecological 
psychology need to be underscored as particularly helpful here: the dependence 
of cognition on action and the value-realizing aspect of cognition. 
First, as shown earlier, the formation of affordances in development 
takes place in an “action ﬁrst” manner (e.g., Thelen, 1985). The changing action 
repertoire enables novel perceptions and informational speciﬁcations of 
behaviors to be provided by the environment (Reed, 1995), endowing the 
offerings of the world with particular intentionality (Heft, 1989). In our case, it 
is crucial that practically any broadening of the early repertoire of an infant 
occurs within interactions, thus it develops “co-action ﬁrst,” giving a primacy 
to the “we” (Rączaszek-Leonardi & Cowley, 2012), that is, to collective action 
over individual action. This changes the unit of adaptability and broadens the 
repertoire of what might be attainable (a dyad might be able to do more than an 
individual). 
Second, tuning one’s actions to such constraints in dialogical co-action 
within a speciﬁc cultural context (Bruner, 1983; Rączaszek-Leonardi et al., 
2013) makes them much richer and value saturated than a simple association in 
the infant’s head: “I gaze—mother follows.” Gaze becomes an affordance, 
makes sense, only in a larger schema of events, such as realizing common goals 
and preserving important societal and cultural values. This is another advantage 
that stems from employing the framework of ecological psychology: 
reintroducing values into scientiﬁc explanations of behavior (Gibson & Crooks, 
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1938; Hodges, 2014; Hodges & Baron, 1992; Hodges & Rączaszek-Leonardi, 
in preparation). Values provide boundary conditions on the timing, sequential 
order, and regularity of social affordances, therefore ﬁne-tuning the 
coordination of attention, mutual respect, and agency of the participants 
(Nomikou et al., in press; Rączaszek-Leonardi & Nomikou, 2015). 
Connectedly, shaping the social affordances is aided by the fact that the world 
of the infant is saturated by “dynamically changing emotional contours” 
(Leavens et al., 2014, p. 1), which scaffold the awareness of other people’s 
affective states. In the aforementioned example, the contingent responsiveness 
to infant gaze, the continuous use of rising intonation at the end of each 
utterance of the mother, but also the lack of tension on the infant’s face and 
body, all indicate the emotional attractiveness of the current action for both 
participants and constitute affordances (constraints) for its trajectory (Jensen & 
Pedersen, 2016). 
The dynamical systems approach to the informational role of social 
affordances serves to guide operationalization of the constraining function of 
the situation and particular behaviors. The way in which and extent to which 
the parent’s and child’s behavior as well as the dyad’s as a whole are 
constrained can be measured using dynamical systems tools (Kelso, 1995; 
Thelen & Smith, 1994). This includes measuring the degree of constraint 
(dimensionality reduction; e.g., Riley, Richardson, Shockley, & Ramenzoni, 
2011; Shockley, Santana, & Fowler, 2003; Yu & Smith, 2012), the strength of 
coupling (Nomikou, Leonardi, Rohlﬁng, & Rączaszek-Leonardi, 2016; 
Warlaumont, Richards, Gilkerson, & Oller, 2014), the speciﬁc properties of 
coupling (Leonardi, Nomikou, Rohlﬁng, & Rączaszek-Leonardi, 2016), and 
identiﬁcation of the nonobvious parameters and timescales on which behaviors 
might be matched (Abney, Warlaumont, Oller, Wallot, & Kello, 2016). For 
example, in Nomikou et al. (2016), we have shown quantitatively, using cross-
recurrence analyses, how the gaze of an infant is an important behavior for the 
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mother (i.e., how it constrains her behavior in the sense that some of her 
behaviors after the child’s change in gaze direction become more probable than 
others) and how mother’s gaze becomes increasingly important for a child (i.e., 
constrains the child’s gaze). 
Finally, a semiotic analysis of the informational processes is useful for 
distinguishing among the variety of the types of constraining relations that a 
given behavior provides. In our example, the gaze of a child serves as an index 
for the mother that the child has an interest in interacting with or obtaining 
some object. In response the mother strives to create a “social physics” around 
this gaze, helping it to become a communicative index useful in future contexts. 
Thus the child comes to anticipate this effect and thereby uses his or her gaze as 
a controlling index. In addition, because the directionality of the child’s gaze is 
spatially correlated with the directionality of the gaze and actions of the mother, 
it provides iconic information, via this parallel form, about the focus of 
attention. Later development of pointing gestures further tunes this 
communicative function (e.g., Gomez, 2007). 
Semiotic analysis also makes evident another important feature of such 
information-controlled dynamics. It demonstrates that these early iconic and 
indexical behaviors are already conventional and therefore partially arbitrary 
with respect to which aspects of behavior are taken to be signiﬁcant. 
Conventionality and arbitrariness are thus not the exclusive property of 
symbols. What becomes an affordance and which behaviors it will specify 
depends on selective reenactments of certain sequences of events. These 
sequences may use natural propensities but are also differently shaped by a 
given culture. A caregiver will not take any response as a valid contribution to 
an interaction. In an example described by Heller & Rohlﬁng (2017), a 9-
month-old girl wanted to point with her nose to a picture as a reaction to the 
mother’s question “Where is the spoon?” The mother did not accept it as a 
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conventional means and kept asking. Finally, she answered herself by pointing, 
and the girl imitated it soon after. We give similar examples below in 
interactions with much younger children (see, e.g., Example 2). Cultural 
conventionality is evident long before symbolic language emerges. It is the 
enacted cultural “social physics” and not material physics that shapes the niche 
of a developing child and is a source of constraints on behavior. 
By the same token, because the enactments are selected for their 
interaction control value, they may bind selected features of behavior with 
speciﬁc types of effects, which leads the way to abstractness and generalization, 
similarly as in Gibson’s ecological psychology framework (Gibson, 1986) there 
is abstraction of invariants from a structured environment. In other words, 
semiotic analysis helps us realize how interactive dynamics is meaningfully 
constrained by a variety of informational relations. The world of an infant is 
full of directly perceived intentional, conventional, and even abstract 
constraints (that we might describe as semiotic affordances) even before 
language emerges as a symbolic system. 
The ways language means: A variety of semiotic engagements of 
linguistic forms 
The individual and interactive dynamics are thus from a very early stage under 
control by actions that become affordances. Such actions obviously also include 
linguistic utterances. Language is an important part of the multimodal streams 
of behavior from day one or even earlier (Nomikou & Rohlﬁng, 2011). From 
birth, it is intertwined in interactional value-realizing and goal-oriented actions. 
For this reason, it is important NOT to treat language used in those interactions 
as something distinct from other actions. Without giving utterances any 
privileged role or any putative properties of symbols (such as being arbitrary, 
conventional, abstract, or formal), we thus see them as any other behavior 
functioning in action–perception control loops. Just as any other actions and 
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gestures, they will be built upon natural sensitivities and tuned to as important 
events in “social physics” that help infants predict and, with time, control 
patterns of social interaction. 
In other words, using semiotic terminology, utterances in early 
interactions can be shown to function as indices and icons, acquiring the power 
of controlling behavior in the way that other social signals do. And they are 
already conventional—selectively honed by a history of interactions—but not 
yet symbolic. This again points to the importance of routines (Heller & 
Rohlﬁng, 2017 Rączaszek-Leonardi et al., 2013; Rohlﬁng et al., 2016) and play 
(Bruner, 1983; Nomikou et al., 2017) in establishing an early role for the 
nonsymbolic use of words, enabling the child to become an active user of these 
signs in interaction control. Routines and “formats” (Bruner, 1983), which 
constitute the social niche, thus include also Wittgenstein’s “language games” 
(Wittgenstein, 1953/1958), providing structures where behaviors (including 
utterances), objects, and events can become informational, that is, gain the 
power to functionally constrain interactional behavior. But at this stage these 
utterances are still fully grounded iconic and indexical signs, being embedded 
in the stream of physical, multimodal co-actions with the infant, regulated by 
goals (Rohlﬁng et al., 2016) and values (Nomikou & Rączaszek-Leonardi, 
2015) long before a value or a goal can be grasped by an infant. 
In the following section we present two examples of situations in which 
language serves as such control, where the particular enactments tune a child to 
the constraining effects that certain utterances (and/or their properties, such as 
prosody or stress) tend to have in interaction. They thus function as indices and 
icons in social physics, helping to predict and control the events. 
Example 2: Where does ‘Hello’ go in the interaction? 
Here we give an example of the mother using a speciﬁc utterance “Hello” in 
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speciﬁc moments of interaction, contingent on infant’s behavior. 
VP01_1T (00:20– 00:28) 3-month-old boy 
The infant is still in a drowsy state and the mother begins to gently stroke his 
cheeks and blow air on his face to wake him up. She is leaning over the infant 
with her elbows resting on the changing table (image above line 2). 
In line 1 the mother’s attempt is successful as in the left image above 
line 2 the infant opens his eyes very slightly. The mother has her face 
positioned right in front of the infant and as soon as she sees a slight opening of 
the eyelids she produces a prolonged greeting while smiling (right image above 
line 2). 
1 ((mother blows into infant’s face)) 
 
2 M: ja:: hallo ((breathes in and blows)) 
        yes hello 
3 M: ja hallo wer ist denn da? 
  yes hello who is there? 
The sequence continues around half a minute later (see the following transcript) 
in which we have the next opening of the infant eyes. In line 1 we can see that 
although the infant has opened his eyes (left image above line 1) the mother has 
not noticed it because she is opening his romper suit (central image above line 
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1). 
VP01_1T (00:53 – 00:59) 
 
1 M: ah ist das schön 
        ah isn’t that nice 
 
2 M: ja hallo: 
        yes hello 
3 ((inbreathe)) ja hallo: 
    yes hello 
Upon concluding her utterance she looks up (right image above line 1) and 
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notices that the infant has opened his eyes. In reaction to this in line 2, she 
initiates a new greeting. This greeting is contrasted to her previous utterance in 
multiple ways. She modiﬁes her head position making a swaying movement in 
synchrony with her utterance; she raises her eyebrows and produces a big smile 
(the image above line 2). As the infant maintains his attention to her face she 
repeats the greeting (line 3), this time marking the transition to the next 
utterance with an exaggerated inbreathe and movement of the head. 
In the sequence presented so far the mother responds to the opening of 
the infant’s eyes with a rich range of behaviors. From the perspective of the 
infant, opening the eyes and engaging in eye contact is met with a set of very 
speciﬁc cues, that is, a consistent linguistic form “hello” accompanied by 
coordinated facial expressions and head movements. At the same time, the 
combination of these verbal and affective cues construct an emotional setting 
that might motivate the infant to participate in the interaction and “share” the 
interactive experience with the caregiver. 
Various properties of speech may play various semiotic functions, not 
only the form of a word (at the beginning the form is probably least likely to be 
differentiated properly) but also the timing of vocalization and the intonation 
patterns might initially be especially potent constraints (Gratier & Trevarthen, 
2008; Trevarthen, 1974). In connection to later development, Bruner described 
such a semiotic process of attentional control when he said, “The ﬁrst phase of 
managing joint attention, very much under the control of the mother, thus 
appears to result in the child discovering signals in the mother’s speech that 
indicate that the mother is attending to “something to look at” (Bruner, 1983, p. 
73, emphasis added). Thus children may develop sensitivity to “undifferentiated 
deictics” (in a sense quite abstract, as in “there is something somewhere in the 
environment to attend to”), often indicated by a rising intonation pattern 
(carved perhaps from the natural sensitivity to fast-rising stress). Such 
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behaviors of caregivers become “alerting signals” about the possibility of 
attentional shift. Adding to this, the rich experiences gained by such affective 
exchanges might motivate infants to follow another person’s focus of attention 
(Leavens et al., 2014). 
The importance of the prosodic contour is evident in our example. 
Continuing the same interaction, 20 s later, the sequence proceeds, with the 
mother initiating a peek-a-boo game in which she uses the infant’s socks to 
cover and uncover his eyes. After a few iterations of the game a new set of 
greetings are produced by the mother, requiring a richer participation from the 
infant. 
VP01_1T (01:15 – 01:26) 
 
Figure 1 Interaction sequence between mother and infant. The mother’s turns are 
verbal utterances and the infant’s turns are smiles. The arrows indicate the sequencing 
of the turn exchanges. The numbers refer to the intonation curves presented in Figure 
2. 
The sequence begins with the mother’s question “Where is the baby?” (Figure 
1, ﬁrst text box on the left) upon which the infant gazes neutrally at the mother 
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(ﬁrst image on the left). She responds with “There he is.” The infant responds 
to this with a smile (indicated with the number 5) upon which the mother 
pauses the peek-a-boo game and responds with a greeting. The subsequent 
production of smiles produces consecutive greetings. The sequence also shows 
a climax as the next smile produced by the infant in the sequence is more 
intense than the previous. Mother and infant reciprocate each other’s 
greeting/smile four times in this sequence. It is only when the infant returns to a 
more neutral position (last image on the right) that the sequence is completed 
and the mother returns to the peek-a-boo game. In this sequence, we can see the 
active shaping of a smile as the correct response to a greeting. The infant 
receives a very speciﬁc reaction to a very speciﬁc behavior that he produces. In 
comparison to the ﬁrst part of the sequence in which “eye contact” was the 
necessary requirement for the mother’s reaction, here we see that the infant 
response is further speciﬁed as a smile. Thus, it is a different signal by the 
infant that receives the rewarding of the multimodal package of the greeting. As 
shown by the arrows indicating the exchange of turns, the mother produces one 
greeting after each smile (and no greeting if a child does not smile). At the 
same time, the mutual gaze at each other’s face and the exchange of smiles is a 
kind of acknowledgment of the jointness of the interaction (Carpenter & Liebal, 
2012) and in this case also an awareness of the interactive roles of the 
participants. 
Apart from the recurring “hello” and the nonverbal modalities 
coordinated with this greeting such as looming forward and approaching the 
infant’s face, smiling and raising eyebrows, loud inbreathes synchronized with 
head movements, there is still an even richer package of resources framing this 
activity, such as a distinct intonation pattern repeated with every greeting. As 
illustrated in Figure 2, all greetings produced by the mother in this larger 
sequence follow a more or less bell-shaped intonation curve, with a high 
contrasting rise at the beginning and a lowering at the end. This produces a 
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strong cue, indicating that all these instances (which follow the infant’s smile) 
potentially share some qualities and are of the same kind. 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the intonation curves corresponding to the greetings of the 
mother from the elaborated example. The red circles mark the exact intonation curves, 
which show a pattern of a sudden rise and then fall.  
In this data corpus such openings were often followed by an enactment of an 
entire greeting routine such as “How are you?” or “Did you sleep well last 
night?” The consistent prosodic shape of the “Hello” further helps differentiate 
this particular utterance and place it in the stream of multimodal events. The 
form of prosodic contour may later serve as a distinguishing property of 
utterances placed at this particular moment of interaction and, for example, 
make it possible to substitute “Hello” with other utterances, such as “Good 
morning” having a similar pragmatic function. 
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It is often the case that the indexicality and iconicity of an utterance 
come together when not only the contingency in time helps predict the 
occurrence of a certain event but also the property of an utterance 
(accompanying certain event) allows one to predict its physical parameters. 
Below we show an example of shaping the prosody of the utterance in a way 
that it ﬁts the action of the mother (some properties of the utterances are thus 
icons for some properties of action). 
Example 3: Iconic cues to action in language 
VP11_1T (05:48 – 05:59) 3-month-old boy 
In this example the mother is dressing the child. She has just ﬁnished putting 
his legs in the tights and in line 1 rolls the infant on his side to pull up his tights 
over his diaper. In doing so she synchronizes the onset and offset of her 
utterance with the duration of the rolling movement. 
More speciﬁcally, while grasping the infant’s arm (left image above line 
1) she produces the “one” (see line 1) and then initiates the rolling movement 
by repeating the word “roll” three times throughout the movement (central 
image above line 1) until she stops (right image above line 1). By doing so she 
recreates with her utterance the physical property of the rolling movement, that 
is, a sound that cycles. This is made even more perceivable through her 
intonation, which is somewhat U-shaped (moves down and then up). 
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1 M: ein mal [rolle] rolle [rolle:: 
        one time roll roll roll 
2 I: [(voc.)] [(voc.)  
 
 
3 M: ja [ah ist] die doofe Flasche im Weg 
        yes ah it’s the stupid bottle in the way 
4 I: [(voc.)] 
5 (3.11) 
6 M: [u::nd wieder zü::ruck 
        and again back 
7 I: [(voc.) 
A similar pattern is recreated in line 6 in which she rolls the infant back on his 
back. Here she again times her utterance precisely to follow the movement of 
the infant’s body. She places her hands on the infant’s back when saying “and” 
(left image above line 6) and stretches the word “back” so that it coincides with 
the duration of the rolling movement. Note that here she again uses the same 
intonation patterns as in the previous rolling movement, tying the two together 
(see Figure 3). 
Thus, in a similar “ecological” manner as any other action or gesture, 
various properties of speech are selected to play a constraining role in 
interactions. Tuning to them is similar to tuning to any other social affordance. 
In a similar way as in the examples of, for example, gaze, we can use the 
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dynamical systems analyses to assess the extent that utterances in early 
interactions constrain the degrees of freedom of the interactive system. 
Semiotic analysis shows why speaking of early language use should not be 
confused with using language as a system of symbols. 
 
Figure 3 Intonation pattern of mother’s utterance accompanying the rolling movement 
of the infant’s body.  
Utterances are ﬁrst treated as indices (used to predict timing, occurrence of 
events) or icons (used to predict certain properties of events). They elicit 
emotions, establish rhythms, partition events, and manage attention long before 
they become symbolic and—it is important to note—serve these afterward as 
well! Such connection to dynamic interaction, we claim, provides the ground 
for subsequent forms of symbolic reference and control that emerge with later 
language development. Such grounding does not vanish, thus ensuring that 
linguistic means of control (which will, in time, become symbolic) remain 
nonmiraculously, causally connected to the ongoing stream of events. 
In this treatment of utterances of language—ﬁrst as indices and icons 
and therefore NOT as arbitrarily mapping to things in the world—we can be 
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more precise in our analysis of the referential properties of language. It is 
important to note that “names” for “objects” at these early stages are rather 
icons and indices for aspects of coordinated behavior (sometimes, indeed, with 
respect to objects). An uttered noun for an adult might be a “name” of an 
object, but most likely for an infant in early interactions it is an attentional or 
action coordinator. An utterance “Oh, look!” is not a name of the thing or even 
a name for action but rather an index predicting the dyad’s joint gaze structure. 
In short, in early interactions speech is very often performative in the sense that 
it affords a sequence of multimodal actions. It is within these pragmatic frames, 
and not “semantic” or “image schemas” frames (which are traditionally linked 
to describing or mapping the world), that utterances gain their controlling 
properties. Speaking of later language development, Bruner (1983) noted, 
Paradoxically, the learning of speech acts may be easier and less 
mysterious than the learning either of syntax or semantics. For the child’s 
syntactic errors are rarely followed by corrective feedback, and semantic 
feedback is often lax. But speech acts, on the contrary, get not only 
immediate feedback but also correction. (pp. 37—38) 
The accentuated performative role and the immersion in multimodal co-
action makes the ungrounding problem seemingly harder. How can language 
ever detach from this carefully orchestrated, multimodal dyadic enactment to 
become symbolic? However, paradoxically, understanding the functional 
groundedness in the various modalities and co-actions is a key support for the 
ungrounding process, which at the same time preserves these causal inﬂuences 
on social dynamics. 
The emergence of symbols: Not just conventional icons or indices but 
elements of a system 
These distinctions are at the core of the ungrounding problem. To reiterate: this 
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is a problem of (a) how grounded iconic and indexical informational forms can 
give rise to the degree of abstractness, arbitrariness, and formal properties of a 
symbolic system and at the same time (b) how they remain informational with 
respect to individual and interactive dynamics, that is, causally intertwined in 
linguistically mediated co-action. 
As we pointed out in the previous section, any actions and gestures can 
become informative controls on co-action, with some degree of conventionality 
and arbitrariness even though indexical and iconic. These are thus not exclusive 
properties of symbolic reference as exempliﬁed by language. Conventionality is 
already a feature of all the actions that are socially shaped into cultural routines. 
According to Deacon (2011), it is a common mistake to confuse the 
conventionality of symbolic reference with the conventionality of the form of 
the sign vehicles themselves. One can easily have conventional icons, as 
exempliﬁed by the international variety of icons for toilets for women and men, 
and conventional indices as, for example, in “social physics” of culturally 
distinct greeting gestures. 
Thus, the property of conventionality is neither a distinguishing nor 
sufﬁcient property for informational forms to be symbolic. Although the form 
of sign vehicles able to provide symbolic reference is necessarily conventional, 
they may also retain a degree of iconicity (Dingemanse, Blasi, Lupyan, 
Christiansen, & Monaghan, 2015; Kohler, 1929, 1947; Perniss, Thompson, & 
Vigliocco, 2010) or indexicality, but these features are not determinants of their 
referential function. Symbols must be doubly conventional: conventional sign 
vehicles with conventionally determined reference. So, the ungrounding 
process involves decoupling sign vehicle properties from the properties of what 
they refer to. It is in this process of abandoning intrinsic grounding that “by 
using language ﬁrst for limited ends the child comes ﬁnally to recognize its 
more powerful, productive uses” (Bruner, 1983, p. 7). 
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Following the semiotic account provided by Deacon (1997), we propose 
that the ungrounding from the immediate stream of multimodal co-action is 
possible because of a shift from direct iconic and indexical relations of 
utterances to other multimodal events to using iconic and indexical relations 
between sign vehicles to disambiguate reference. Whereas presymbolic 
grounding relies on being causally and predictively involved as controls on 
multimodal interactions, symbolic grounding is mediated by systemic icons and 
indexical relationships among linguistic forms themselves. This indirect 
grounding is not just “learning abstract associations” between utterances and 
referents. It is a function of iconicity and indexical relations between these 
forms and how this higher order relational structure retains a grounded iconic or 
indexical relation to social physics. Linguistic utterances, unlike most of other 
controlling actions or gestures, are thus embedded in parallel, both in ongoing 
multimodal interactivity in which linguistic forms are indices and icons 
controlling the interaction and (also as icons and indices) within complex 
linguistic structures. The latter loosens the grip of the ﬁrst grounding, giving 
linguistic utterances partial freedom from the social physics they modulate. 
In a similar vein, Zukow-Goldring (1996, p. 207), spoke about 
“additional perceptual structure” that is provided by the parents in order to 
highlight new elements that are introduced in routinized actions. It is important 
to note that infants can rely on “social physics” and their knowledge about what 
is happening. Parents use these structures, then, to relate language to these 
events. Rader and Zukow-Goldring (2010) successfully showed that providing 
language and action simultaneously is an effective way to convey the meaning 
of a new word to 9-to-14-month-old infants. Although this experiment clearly 
shows that parents can limit choices and socialize children’s attention (Zukow-
Goldring, 1990), it does not address the process of ungrounding the language. 
In her work, Zukow-Goldring (1996) provided, however, some ideas about this 
problem. More speciﬁcally, she was of the opinion that routines provide a solid 
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basis for language understanding because the child knows what will happen. 
Thus, the knowledge about actions and their order is at the bottom of symbolic 
understanding: “Knowing what is going on appears to emerge a step of two 
ahead of knowing how to relate language to those events” (p. 208). In fact, 
Zukow-Goldring (1996) proposed that language might be particularly helpful in 
breakdowns in communication bringing up invariant aspects between familiar 
and unfamiliar settings. 
In order to show how this contributes to the ungrounding of symbolic 
forms in language development, two kinds of evidence are required: ﬁrst, we 
must demonstrate how the infant’s enacted environment facilitates tuning to the 
relations among linguistic utterances. This involves making modality-speciﬁc 
(linguistic) contingencies in the co-actions with infants more salient with age, 
giving them a priority over multimodal contingencies. Second, we must 
demonstrate how the iconic and indexical relations among utterances, and not 
undifferentiated expressions, become effective constraints on co-action and 
provide the possibility for novel modes of social control. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. A cross-recurrence proﬁle of vocalizations, showing the emergence of turn-
taking structure at 6 and 8 months. Note that the probability (shown as percentage 
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recurrence, that is, matching behavior of mother and infant) that the simultaneous 
vocalization of infant and mother will co-occur (i.e., match at lag 0) decreases with the 
infant’s age. 
Emergent linguistic layer 
The emergent linguistic “modality” (not a module), which might facilitate this 
second kind of grounding of linguistic utterances in other utterances is visible 
in the distribution of possible reactions to infants’ vocalizations. Using an 
earlier established dialogicity of actions (now-you, now-me) parents establish 
the same pattern in a vocal domain. This process can be observed from the 
earliest months, ﬁrst in the emergent turn-taking structure of actions (e.g., Kaye 
& Wells, 1980) and then in the vocal modality (Leonardi et al., 2016). In the 
latter case, we observe a decrease in the probability of overlaps between the 
ages of 3 and 6 months (Figure 4), which stands in contrast to, for example, 
progressively coupled structure of gaze in the same age range (increase in the 
probability of mutual gaze, where instead of the valley, present in Figure 4, we 
observe a peak at the 0 lag; Nomikou et al., 2016). 
Another crucial process in co-creation of the realm of language is the 
infant-age-dependent propensity of the caretakers to single out some 
vocalizations rather than others and to respond with language to more language-
like vocalizations (Radkowska, Nomikou, Leonardi, Rohlﬁng, & Rączaszek-
Leonardi, 2017; Warlaumont et al., 2014). Again, note that a system created in 
this way is a dialogical system: a child discovers that some elements go 
together, for example, as adjacent pairs and not only in a stream of mother’s 
talk. 
Such proto-conversations begin early and may have diverse forms, from 
the ﬁrst months when mothers take the vocalizations of infants as contributions 
to dialogue and embed them either in elaborate conversations or playful 
  
 
 
37 
imitations. Following we have examples of both. 
Example 4: Responses to early infant vocalizations 
Example VP10_6T (05:05 – 05:35) 8-month-old boy 
This example begins with the mother having just ﬁnished changing the diaper 
and she is leaning in toward the infant, who is holding and moving a tube of 
cream in his hands (see image above line 1). The mother begins by asking a 
question (line 1) and after a long pause in line 2 proceeds with an elaboration 
(lines 3 and 4). 
 
01 M: ist die tube interessant 
          is the tube interesting? 
02 (1.74) 
03 M: ja(h)a (.) von vielen verschiedenen seiten kann man die= 
          =angucken ne? 
           ye(h)es (.) from different sides you can watch it, huh? 
04 (1.13) 
05 M: und die sieht von jeder seite anders aus 
          and it looks different from each side 
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In line 06 the infant extends his arm holding the tube toward the mother while 
shifting his gaze toward the mother (left image above line 6). The mother at this 
point is looking at the infant (central image above line 6). Having engaged in 
eye contact with her he vocalizes (line 6) and then directly switches his gaze 
back to the tube (right image above line 6). The mother in line 7 responds to 
this initiative by imitating the infant vocalization while shifting her gaze to the 
tube, too (images above line 7). They are now jointly looking at this object. 
 
 
06 I: ((voc.)  
 
 
07 M: ((imitates)) ((inbreathe)) ((imitates)) 
The sequence continues with mother and infant looking at the tube and 
engaging in a conversation-like turn-taking sequence that ends in line 14 with a 
statement from the mother about the action of the infant’s hands (line 14). 
08 I: ((voc)) 
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09 M: ((imitates)) 
10 I: ((voc)) 
11 M: eine schöne tube 
          a pretty tube 
12 (0.96) 
13 I: ((voc)) 
14 M: und was die hände alles so machen können 
         and the hands all the stuff they can do 
Until line 14 the interaction gives the impression of being about the tube. The 
infant shows awareness of the positioning of his verbal utterances in terms of 
the interaction structure with the mother but also in terms of the management of 
attention with her (raising the tube, engaging in eye contact with her, then 
vocalizing and returning his gaze to the object). Also, the mother is treating the 
infant’s utterances as meaningful contributions in a dialogue, creating pauses 
for those contributions at speciﬁc moments. 
In line 16 a new episode begins that has a different structure, where not 
so much the object of mutual attention but rather exchanging these playful 
vocalizations is the main focus. The infant has now lowered his arm holding the 
tube and after a pause looks up at the mother and vocalizes while sustaining eye 
contact with her. What follows is an iteration of three sets of turns (lines 16–
21). 
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15 (0.81)  
16 I: ((voc)) 
17 M: ((imitation)) 18 (0.96) 
19 I: ((voc)) 
20 M: ((imitation))  
21 (1.36) 
22 I: ((voc)) 
23 M: ((imitation)) 
 
24 I: ((infant smiles)) 
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25 M: ((mother smiles)) 
The pairs of turns in this sequence are very precisely matched as can be seen in 
Figure 5. They are separated by clear pauses, meaning that the infant waits after 
the vocalization of the mother to initiate the next pair. The mother produces a 
vocalization that resembles the pitch level of the infant and the phonological 
properties. Interestingly she is adding an element to the sequence as the 
intonation patterns of mother and infant are complementary, with the infant 
vocalization having a slight rising intonation, while the imitation of the mother 
has a falling intonation. These patterns give the sequence a playful character, 
which is evidenced by the fact that after the three sets of turns the infant stops 
vocalizing and produces a large smile (image above line 22), which is then 
followed by a mother smile (image above line 23) and the sequence ends there. 
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Figure 5 Intonation pattern of the mother-infant vocal play described earlier. Marked 
in red are the infant’s utterances and in green the mother’s utterances. It becomes 
visible that the vocalizations are matched in pitch level and that they show 
complementary intonation patterns (rising-falling) 
As in the case of establishing particular actions (e.g., gaze) as informative in 
interactive situations, also in this process, speciﬁc games, routine formats, and 
pragmatic frames are important. For example, some of the games, with older 
children, have a dialogical structure, which forces the interactants to remain 
within a vocal modality, with components of utterances provided by both 
participants. Rohlﬁng et al. (2016) recognized that, for example, labeling 
routines are also such formats, preparing the child to perceive a label and to 
remember it. 
In this way the linguistic modality is accentuated by an increase in the 
probability of responding to language-like vocalizations with language. The 
linguistic modality emerges, progressively differentiating from the multimodal 
interactions of infants and caregivers2. The discovery of linguistic statistical 
                                                   
2 This direction of function specialization in development has been also argued as a 
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regularities in this system might be facilitated by this emergence. 
Relations matter 
This emerging layer, in which utterances enter in relations with other utterances 
is crucial for loosening the strong constraining role that speciﬁc, structurally 
undifferentiated elements of language have in multimodal interactions. It is 
within this layer that relationships among utterances will be noticed, which is 
crucial for this loosening. 
As a ﬁrst analysis of the process it is useful to examine a highly 
simpliﬁed example. In cognitive-semiotic terms, this process has been 
investigated by Deacon (1997) and illustrated by his account of how a very 
limited form of symbolic communication emerged in chimpanzees trained to 
use an artiﬁcial symbol system. In this well-known case (Savage-Rumbaugh, 
Rumbaugh, Smith & Lawson, 1980), it is easier to observe the transition from a 
grounded indexical understanding of individual sign vehicles (lexigrams) to 
understanding them as a system of symbolic relations both because of the 
simplicity of the system and because the process is slowed down, as the 
chimpanzees struggled to make the transition. In other work we’ve described 
the theoretical framework for this passage in more detail (Rączaszek-
Leonardi& Deacon, in preparation). 
In this study six lexigrams (buttons marked with randomly correlated 
patterns corresponding to two foods, two drinks, and two means of delivery) 
needed to be pressed in two-lexigram combinations (ignoring trial initiation 
actions) in order to control delivery of two foods and two drinks using their 
corresponding delivery devices. Given the combinatorial structure of the task, 
                                                                                                                                         
viable alternative to native “modularity,” most notably by Annette Karmiloff-Smith, 
1992).  
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in which a lexigram for a food or drink had to be combined in a speciﬁc order 
with the appropriate delivery lexigram, only four of 30 two-lexigram 
combinations were meaningful (and vastly many more if combinations of more 
than two lexigrams could be selected). So even discovering the correct 
combinations by trial and error would not be a trivial challenge, but the 
problem was made more difﬁcult because the chimps tended to understand the 
problem indexically, that is, ﬁxating on a successful trial as a holistic one-to- 
one mapping between a combination of lexigrams and a food/drink reward and 
not noticing that working combinations involved an agreement rule between 
lexigrams. To overcome this tendency the experimenters ultimately had to train 
them ﬁrst to make erroneous indexical associations and then systematically 
extinguish these associations. When, by a systematic process of elimination, the 
chimpanzees ﬁnally limited their choices to only the four “correct” 
combinations, they had effectively learned to avoid a huge number of incorrect 
combinations. The mnemonic demands of keeping track of all excluded 
possibilities is therefore quite signiﬁcant. So discovering that the same result 
can also be obtained by merely attending to the four relations of agreement and 
exclusion of two-lexigram combinations vastly eases the mnemonic load. It also 
foregrounds the correlated physical relations distinguishing the delivery of food 
versus drink. Four stages of this transition are depicted in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 Stages for transition from a grounded indexical understanding of individual 
sign vehicles (lexigrams) to understanding them as a system of symbolic relations. 
The transition from indexical to symbolic use of lexigrams in this chimpanzee 
study can serve as a guide to understand the transition that occurs in child 
language development. In language development, patterns stabilizing which 
utterances go together are provided by the adult’s utterances and by enactments 
of early dialogue. This grounding of utterances in other utterances provides a 
possibility for their partial ungrounding from simple causal and iconic relations 
to ongoing events. This is because the interactions now can be inﬂuenced not 
only by single (or undifferentiated) linguistic forms but also by the relations 
among them. Below we provide examples of interactive situations and events 
that may facilitate this change. 
One of the earliest situations that may lead to noting utterance-utterance 
relations and, in turn, their involvement in interaction is when the stream of talk 
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from a mother is tightly coupled to the co-action with a child. Again play 
routines and games are important here. They provide structures in which the 
two types of grounding match (in a sort of iconic relation): the structure of the 
events will iconically reﬂect the structure of language used in the games. As 
Bruner (1983, p. 40–41) noted, “Lexical and phrasal substitutes” appear for 
“familiar gestural and vocal means for effecting various communicative 
functions.” This iconicity is reminiscent of the pragmatic matrix that is 
postulated for early utterances (Tomasello, 2003). Although the child does not 
seem to be linguistically productive using ﬁrst utterances, the repetition of some 
words within a context is a clear reﬂection of pragmatic understanding. 
In the following section we present an example of such a “parallel” 
language-action game with a 3-month-old infant. 
Example 5: The coordination of language and co-action structures 
VP06_1T (08:00 – 08:12) 3-month-old girl 
 
In the aforementioned example the mother is accompanying her speech with a 
conventionalized movement of her hands. She is “walking up” the infant’s body 
while talking about the mouse climbing up, touching the infant’s forehead 
while “knocking” on the door and ﬁnishing by touching the infant’s nose while 
saying “Mrs. Noseman.” We can see here a longer verbal utterance 
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accompanied with a set combination of movements performed on the infant’s 
body. Another way of structuring the niche of the infant that may lead to 
noticing how relations work to constrain interactions comes from the pragmatic 
involvement of speech in increasingly complex situations. As the child’s 
abilities grow (he or she can sit, shift attention swiftly, engage with multiple 
objects and persons) so do his or her needs in dealing with the world. Bruner 
(1983) claimed that the pragmatic formats of invitational requests are especially 
conducive for children to use their ﬁrst multiword utterances (“when one was 
secure enough to invite, one had the courage as well to try out new forms”; 
Bruner, 1983, p. 115). Also, as mentioned earlier, the pragmatic aspects of 
language receive much more feedback and correction than “purely” semantic or 
syntactic ones. This may also aid the process of detaching from the simple 
indexicality and iconicity of word use. 
As some researchers claim (Brown, as quoted by Bruner, 1983, p. 35), 
“at the two-word stage of language acquisition more than three quarters of the 
child’s utterance embody only [a] half-dozen semantic relations that are, at 
base, case or caselike relations—Agent-Action, Action-Object, Possession etc.” 
Rather than (or in addition to) reﬂecting the conceptual organization of 
knowledge (e.g., Fillmore, 1976; Nelson, 1974) these may reﬂect the structures 
of co-actions that children are most often involved in at this age and that 
provide pragmatic frames for discovering how relations constrain. Here the 
ecological perspective on a changing niche together with maturational 
processes can again be helpful (see Reed, 1995). As children become more able 
“doers” they need to involve adults into more complex co-actions: thus the 
social context is a source of structure as well. Coordinative needs, with time, 
become too complex for one-word controls. 
Another process that aids in discovering that relations matter, which 
might be more difﬁcult to demonstrate on an observation-by-observation basis, 
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rather requiring large child-directed-speech corpora, is noting the involvement 
of speciﬁc forms that are shared by a variety of linguistic contexts. For 
example, as we note even in our corpora, mothers often use a child’s name 
(which becomes a salient linguistic form rather early) in conjunction with a 
commenting or directive speech such as in “What are we doing today, Iris?” 
“What a mess have we made, Iris!” Bortfeld, Morgan, Golinkoff, and Rathbun 
(2005) pointed to a crucial role of this familiar element of speech for learning 
language’s systemic character. In our Example 2, this is also evident in the case 
of “Hello!” which is followed by various elaborations (“Who is there?” “Where 
is the baby?” Or, in other contexts, “How are you?” “Did you sleep well?”). 
This is one of the ways to signal the compositionality of language parallel with 
involvement in various social situations. 
This systemic aspect has been underscored by usage-based approaches 
to grammar and to language acquisition (e.g., Tomasello, 2003). However, this 
approach to language development can also beneﬁt from a deeper semiotic 
analysis, revealing signiﬁcation hierarchies. Deacon (in press) shows that some 
rudiments of linguistic structuring (such as recursiveness or predicate structure) 
can also be explained by their involvement in semiotic relations. Thus, for 
example, pointing and related deictic means can often substitute for noun 
phrases, demonstrating the role of indexicality in providing grounding for the 
otherwise ungrounded symbolic features of the utterance. This may facilitate 
the transition from pointing gestures to two-word structures and the integration 
of grounded pragmatic communications into the combinatorial logic of early 
grammar and syntax. 
This sort of progressive entwining of pragmatic semiotic interactions 
into linguistic structures may modify their grounding in co-action, but this 
grounding is never lost. In this way a formal causality that is stabilized in 
selected linguistic structures may seep into the basic indexical and iconic 
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grounding, resulting in linguistic (syntactic and other) structures modifying 
even the basic perceptions and interactions with the world (Lucy, 1997). The 
way it is achieved in speciﬁc cases requires extensive further research. We are 
still at the beginning of this endeavor and the goal of this article has been to 
show where to start and to provide basic conceptual and methodological tools 
for organizing such research in a way that does justice both to the functional 
grounding of symbols and to their structural ungroundedness. 
Conclusions 
An ecologically valid approach to understanding how symbolic systems emerge 
and work requires changing the direction of how we posit the symbol-
grounding problem (see also Rączaszek-Leonardi & Deacon, in preparation). 
All signs used for communication start out as any other physical event and 
become recruited for communication because of their particular history of 
exerting control within organism-organism and organism-environment 
relations. We have endeavored to show that physical actions (including 
utterances) that serve iconic and indexical roles in regulating co-action maintain 
their grounding in these activities, i.e., they become parts of “social physics.” 
Thus, it is not their grounding that is a problem but rather explaining how such 
grounded physical forms ever get to be symbols. We proposed that an important 
step in this process hinges on the systemicity of signs that become symbols: 
besides being grounded in co-actions, they are also grounded in relations with 
other signs. We have tried to trace this process on the timescale of language 
development. 
“Ungrounding” of symbolic forms takes place in a multithread complex 
process that at the same time maintains grounding of the system in which they 
are embedded and in which iconic and indexical grounding is progressively 
augmented or replaced by symbol-symbol relations. This involves aspects of 
conventionalization, abstraction, generalization, and systematicity. Only some 
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of those aspects have been elaborated in this article. We hope that we made 
clear that some of the properties that characterize symbolic systems appear 
much earlier in the semiotic hierarchy of informational forms than on the level 
of a fully developed linguistic system, providing a necessary background. In 
this article, we have indicated how conventionality might emerge already at the 
level of simple actions; how the exerted control can be sharpened by a history 
of coordinated interactions; and, ﬁnally, how the ﬁnal step in the process of 
ungrounding symbols, namely, establishing their systemic properties, might 
arise. 
We used the foundation constructed out of three approaches to meaning 
in cognitive systems, which, as we hope to have shown, can complement and 
enrich each other and provide a toolbox of processes for a holistic account of 
the ungrounding process. 
The ecological psychology framework makes it clear how the process of 
language development is tied to the developmental niche. This niche changes 
over time both with the physical abilities of the infant (Reed, 1995, 1996; Walle 
& Campos, 2013) and with the parents adapting the games and pragmatic 
frames and values to be realized to the developing capabilities of the infants. In 
this way, infants are maintained as active and responsible partners of co- action. 
Because ecological psychology does not take symbols for granted, all behaviors 
(including linguistic ones) are understood as properly grounded in ongoing 
perception–action cycles and in slower loops of learning, development, and 
evolution, which sensitize (tune) perceptual systems to the controlling role of 
affordances for action. 
The dynamical systems approach, which for years provided ecological 
psychology with its methodological and analytical toolbox, is also useful in this 
endeavor by allowing the effects of constraints to be measurable in terms of the 
reduction of the degrees of freedom of a system under semiotic control. 
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Finally, semiotics provides a conceptual toolbox for analyzing the 
hierarchic typology of constraints and the historical processes they have to 
undergo to become means for regulating the social physics that the child ﬁnds 
himself or herself in. More important, the semiotic perspective forms a bridge 
between mere social physics and language by distinguishing different ways that 
sign forms can be grounded in the world of pragmatic co-action. This 
emphasizes that the apparent conundrum posed in the cognitive sciences is just 
the tip of a semiotic iceberg that involves a rich infrastructure of dynamical 
iconic and indexical relationships. As Peirce wrote, “Symbols grow. They come 
into being by development out of other signs” (Peirce 1931, Vol. II, #302). 
In the study of language development, it is therefore crucial to 
understand its embedding in (a) the ongoing dynamical multimodal context of 
signiﬁcant co-actions and (b) the context of other linguistic utterances, which 
ultimately emerges as a quite distinct layer of dialogical interactions. It is 
important to note that, even though the latter unleashes novel forms of control 
mediated by the structures of language, language never becomes ungrounded 
from the ﬁrst types of context thus retaining the hold on dynamical interaction. 
Although historically the language development problem has often been posed 
with a directionality similar to that which we have advocated here (see, e.g., the 
titles of classic works in the domain, such as The Emergence of Symbols in 
Development (Bates, 1979), Piaget’s Play, Dreams, and Imitation in Childhood 
(1945/1962) or Werner and Kaplan’s Symbol formation (1963)), even within 
these domains the properties of symbols were rather taken for granted as things 
to be learned by a child and not to be explained by the process of freeing 
informational forms from the immediate dynamical context. It is visible even in 
the work of Elizabeth Bates, who, similar to our account, employed both the 
dynamical systems-like types of explanations and semiotics to construct her 
theory of symbols emergence. A closer look at these analyses of, for example, 
learning a “name” of an object, reveals that the name is treated as an association 
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or mapping to an object where this arbitrary association is learned by a child 
(e.g., Bates, 1979). The immersion of the utterance in complex social physics—
ﬁrst as an index and/or icon— with the intonation, rhythm, and stress being 
equally important as the form, is largely taken for granted and ignored (for 
exceptions see, e.g., Zukow-Goldring & Rader, 2001). 
Our examples from microanalyses of early phases of language 
development in interaction illustrate the ways language is grounded in 
interactive situations. This highlights the role of culturally stabilized reenacted 
routines (Bruner, 1983) in which the instantiation of repetitive indexical and 
iconic relations enables generalization over diverse situations. By performing 
microanalyses of particular moves involved in communicative interactions, we 
have provided examples of both the iconic and indexical semiotic processes that 
are at work in the development of a symbolic system. With these examples, we 
aimed at pointing to the potential of our approach to contribute to 
developmental theories delineating how the interaction between the caregiver 
and the infant enables taking the infant’s skills to the next level of his or her 
development. 
The present approach evidences the continuity of language with other 
intentional communication by underscoring the richness of the functional 
organization of co-action that underlies the capacity to use language. Even the 
systemicity, which we deemed crucial for the process of detachment of 
linguistic structures from the iconic and indexical relations to ongoing events, is 
present in nonlinguistic modalities, for example, in systemic organization of 
functional or pragmatic frames, which are the basis of pretend play (e.g., 
Szokolsky, 2006). The discontinuity in efﬁciency of control comes thus more 
from superimposing various properties than from the emergence of a totally 
novel one, the involvement of speech, which provides energetically cheap and 
easily replicable structures (Rączaszek-Leonardi, 2009), being probably one of 
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the most important. 
Obviously, many challenges remain on the way to ﬂeshing out the 
process of symbolic emergence. In our article, we have only traced this process 
at its very early stages. We left off the account before, among other pertinent 
processes, the subsequent massive statistical learning, which undoubtedly takes 
place once the rudiments of the system are in place, aids discovery of novel 
constructions and relations (Tomasello, 2003), and symbolically transforms the 
function of the more basic semiotic relations. However, in this article we 
offered only a ﬁrst look at some basic principles that govern the process that 
gradually transfers the capacity of functional control to language structures. We 
hope it can serve as a guide for future similar theoretical approaches to these 
later-to-develop and more complex processes and for the kinds of empirical 
work and the data that can validate them. 
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